The Nappy Cat Chronicles

Professor Alva Noë on consciousness:

We should reject the idea that the mind is something inside of us that is basically matter of just a calculating machine. There are different reasons to reject this. But one is, simply put: there is nothing inside us that thinks and feels and is conscious. Consciousness is not something that happens in us. It is something we do.

A much better image is that of the dancer. A dancer is locked into an environment, responsive to music, responsive to a partner. The idea that the dance is a state of us, inside of us, or something that happens in us is crazy. Our ability to dance depends on all sorts of things going on inside of us, but that we are dancing is fundamentally an attunement to the world around us.

The “vaccines cause autism” bullshit is, once again, being purveyed, this time by the cornucopia of popular bullshit, Newsweek. The article discusses Dr. Paul Offit, a relatively well-known pediatrician and author of the 2008 book Autism’s False Prophets: Bad Science, Risky Medicine, and the Search for a Cure. In his book, Offit takes on the bullshit about which Jenny McCarthy likes to prattle. His arguments are driven by assertions like her’s that early childhood vaccinations cause autism spectrum disorders (ASD):

We think our health authorities don’t want to open this can of worms, so they don’t even look or listen. While there is strong debate on this topic, many parents of recovered children will tell you they didn’t treat their child for autism; they treated them for vaccine injury.

Many people aren’t aware that in the 1980s our children received only 10 vaccines by age 5, whereas today they are given 36 immunizations, most of them by age 2. With billions of pharmaceutical dollars, could it be possible that the vaccine program is becoming more of a profit engine then a means of prevention?

Other individuals who have exploited parental anxieties by positing causation include:

• Robert F. Kennedy Jr. with his 2005 article “Deadly Immunity”.
• Autism activist Sallie Bernard, part author of “Autism: a novel form of mercury poisoning”.
• And Dr. Andrew Wakefield, part author of the flawed research article that was published by the prestigious British medical journal, The Lancet, and forever linked the MMR vaccination and autism in the public’s mind.

If mishandled, ASD can be tragic. I work with a few gentlemen who are diagnosed with Autistic Disorder. At any given moment, they can be aggressive, frightened, silly, or friendly. Though they are very impulsive and lack the ability to communicate effectively, they are capable of learning new tasks through modeling and interacting appropriately with others.

McCarthy speaks of “recovery” and “healing.” Although she does not, in this article, specify the indicators of recovery, creating an appropriate diet and increasing an ASD individual’s independent living and communication skills can decrease observable symptoms. Unfortunately, she chooses to expound upon “prevention” as though the science is on her side:

We believe autism is an environmental illness. Vaccines are not the only environmental trigger, but we do think they play a major role. If we are going to solve this problem and finally start to reverse the rate of autism, we need to consider changing the vaccine schedule, reducing the number of shots given and removing certain ingredients that could be toxic to some children.

Sounds reasonable? Perhaps. However, there’s no need to enact any of her recommendations. She’s wrong on all four points. Need proof? Here’s a quick rundown of a few major studies:

In April 1993, the MMR vaccine was replaced with single vaccines in Japan. This enabled Japanese researchers to examine”cumulative incidence of ASD up to age seven for [31,426] children born from 1988 to 1996 in…Yokohama, Japan. ASD cases included all cases of pervasive developmental disorders according to ICD-10 guidelines.” The researchers found that:

• [While] the MMR vaccination rate in the city of Yokohama declined significantly in the birth cohorts of years 1988 through 1992, and not a single vaccination was administered in 1993 or thereafter….cumulative incidence of ASD up to age seven increased significantly in the birth cohorts of years 1988 through 1996 and most notably rose dramatically beginning with the birth cohort of 1993 [emphasis mine].
• MMR vaccination is most unlikely to be a main cause of ASD, that it cannot explain the rise over time in the incidence of ASD, and that withdrawal of MMR in countries where it is still being used cannot be expected to lead to a reduction in the incidence of ASD.

In 2005, an international team of researchers reviewed 31 MMR-related studies from around the world and found that:

• MMR was associated with a lower incidence of upper respiratory tract infections, a higher incidence of irritability, and similar incidence of other adverse effects compared to placebo.
• Exposure to MMR was unlikely to be associated with Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, autism or [mumps].

In 2006, researchers in Quebec “surveyed 27,749 children born from 1987 to 1998 attending 55 schools from the largest [English-speaking] school board. Children with pervasive developmental disorders [which included ASD] were identified by a special needs team.” The researchers found that:

• [T]himerosal exposure was unrelated to the increasing trend in pervasive developmental disorder prevalence.
• [P]ervasive developmental disorder rates significantly increased when MMR vaccination uptake rates significantly decreased.
• [P]ervasive developmental disorder prevalence increased at the same rate before and after the introduction in 1996 of the second MMR dose, suggesting no increased risk of pervasive developmental disorder associated with a 2–measles-mumps-rubella dosing schedule before age 2 years.
• [N]o relationship was found between pervasive developmental disorder rates and 1- or 2-dose MMR immunization schedule.

But, why risk it anyway? Science fumbles all the time, amiright? From the New York Times:

Death rates for 13 diseases that can be prevented by childhood vaccinations are at all-time lows in the United States, according to a study released yesterday.

In nine of the diseases, rates of death or hospitalization declined more than 90 percent since vaccines against them were approved, and in the cases of smallpox, diphtheria and polio, by 100 percent.

In only four diseases — hepatitis A and B, invasive pneumococcal diseases and varicella (the cause of chickenpox and shingles) — did deaths and hospitalizations fall less than 90 percent. Those vaccines are all relatively new — the one for chickenpox, for example, was adopted nationally only in 1995. Also, some diseases like hepatitis typically strike adults, who are less likely to be immunized.

The study showed total or near-total declines in cases of diphtheria, measles, polio, rubella, smallpox and invasive Hib disease, a type of pneumonia for which children are now normally vaccinated at as early as 2 months.

Although it’s not autism, you would think that parents would want to at least save their children the horrible experience of communicable disease infection. Unfortunately, that’s not the case:

Measles has become endemic in Britain, 14 years after its spread was halted in the resident population, the country’s public health watchdog says.

The Health Protection Agency (HPA) warned that the number of unvaccinated children was now large enough to sustain the “continuous spread” of the potentially lethal virus in the community. It blamed a failure by parents over the past 10 years to give their children the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine.

This has resulted in vaccine rates falling below the level necessary to prevent the disease becoming established in the general population….In the last quarter of 2007, the rate stood at 71 per cent for children at age two (first dose) and 50 per cent at age five (second dose) compared with the 95 per cent coverage needed to maintain herd immunity and prevent endemic spread.

So, if you’re a parent, get your loved one vaccinated and remember that rates of autism spectrum disorder are increasing because of three encouraging developments:

1. At one time, an individual with Autistic Disorder may have received a sole diagnosis of Mental Retardation. Doctors can now provide sharper diagnostics and earlier screenings.
2. The government recognizes the existence of autism spectrum disorders and is now providing more funding.
3. And, though we have a long way to go, the public attaches less shame and stigma to autism spectrum disorders and many more advocates have appeared.

As a psychology associate, I deal with medication issues on a daily basis. “Can this challenging behavior in which this client is engaging be prevented by this medication?” The answer is, more often than not, an emphatic “no.” The solution to an individual’s aggression towards others or aggression towards themselves should be dynamic:  Among the mentally ill and, most often, the mentally retarded, the motivation behind an individual’s engagement in a particular behavior is derived from a combination of brain defects, environmental stimuli, learned interpersonal responses, witnessed and experienced trauma, compulsions, emotional reactions, anxiety, and psychosexual drives.

Once a diagnosis based upon symptoms of psychosis, mania, impulsiveness, or severe paranoia is made and the “medication solution” is implemented, an individual’s behavioral motivators become even more unbalanced. Even if not applied recklessly, this continued imbalance occurs for three reasons:

• The “medication solution” may snowball until an individual is prescribed four or five medications each meant to target a particular aspect of the individual’s personality and diagnosed illness or the side effects of another medication. The common types of medications in this sort of regime include an atypical antipsychotic, an SSRI, and a mood stabilizer.
• An individual may fail to have an observable response or may have a profoundly negative reaction to a particular medication. If that occurs, the guilty medication is replaced with a comparable medication that will, in all likelihood, produce more side effects.
• Conventional wisdom dictates that the “medication solution” is best intervention because it is the more cost effective and its positive results are immediate. However, while behavioral changes are often immediate due to anxiolytic effects, the long-term expense of these medications and the sustainable effectiveness of psychotherapeutic intervention and environmental engineering prove conventional wisdom wrong.

I had these points in mind when I read Christopher Lane’s Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness. Lane begins with a terrific visiting of the back-stabbing, tension, infighting, and nastiness that preceded the publication of the American Psychiatric Association’s third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III). The DSM-III is a physician’s field guide to mental illness. Lane presents the DSM-III as human endeavor: The committee responsible for its completion was comprised of egotistical and well-intentioned neuropsychiatrists who narrow-mindedly constructed a flawed document.

From my reading of the DSM-III, this is an accurate assessment and the conclusions that Lane draws, based upon his analysis of his evidence and multiples interviews, are overwhelmingly valid. It is unfortunate then that roughly “normal” individuals should be subjected to pharmaceutical empire that predicates its marketing upon the assertions of the DSM-III.

Lane explains it thusly:

Step One: Take the results of an ambiguous questionnaire to prove that the new disorder far exceeds psychiatrists’ already ample expectations, leading them to suspect the presence of a widespread, underdiagnosed problem. Step Two: List the new disorder in the DSM, thereby inviting drug companies to treat it. Step Three: Shower doctors with free samples of newly minted pills [many doctors have a closet literally filled with free samples], while bombarding television viewers with carefully crafted ads. Step Four: Castigate dissenters for failing to recognize the severity of the illness and for heartlessly prolonging patient suffering. (p. 196)

Ultimately, this type of system thrives in a society in which doing something is considered better than doing nothing and in a culture in which consumerism imparts identity. This is America and, in America, at least one child as young as two has been prescribed one of these mind and body altering medications. The pursuit is ostensibly more important than the happiness.

Lane presents an adequate amount of empirical data and anecdote to compellingly argument that our current crop of psychopharmacological medications are, by-and-large, dangerous and that our current means of distribution are fraught with corruption. Unfortunately, Lane lacks the philosophical cleverness to explore how American culture sustains this beast and where it’s all headed. I, like many other professionals, would like to know; though, something tells me it’s gonna get worse before it gets better.

I was tidying up my miscellaneous website files yesterday and discovered that I had saved the myspace page of Jacob Robida, the psychotic Juggalo and murderer whom I referenced in this post. To read through the comments is to witness an exercise in rationalization and friendship:

In addition to Robida’s profile, I also managed to save James Dungy’s myspace profile. James, the son of Colts coach Tony Dungy, committed suicide in December 2005. Apparently, soon after James’ suicide, the sports site Deadspin posted a link to a copy of his profile and controversy ensued. The media, however, made frequent references to the emotional darkness of the profile without providing any visual context. So, if you weren’t able to catch it, here it is:

Reflexive morbidity aside, I post these as a warning. The way in which one “cries for help” changes with technology. Robida and Dungy’s display of violence worship were not obvious cries for help relative to, for instance, a purposely unsuccessful suicide attempt. But, if your family member or friend advertises their love for and fascination with guns, drugs, killing, dying, and/or Hitler, something is awfully wrong. And these profiles testify to this fact.

[This is a paper I wrote for my Abnormal Psychology graduate class. In it, I review the literature regarding cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for social phobia. Social phobia, also known as Social Anxiety Disorder (which has the unfortunate acronym SAD), is a controversial diagnosis. A psychopharmacological treatment, which is often considered the "quick fix" solution by insurance groups, may do more harm than good. So what's left? CBT is the favored alternative. It is a long-term, expensive, and time-consuming treatment. As such, it works and what is invested during CBT makes the difference between feeling better and getting better.

P.S. This review is a bit dense. Proceed with caution.]

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Social Phobic Individuals

“Among normals, the sequence perception-cognition-emotion is dictated largely by the demand character of the stimulus situation. . . [However] the paranoid patient may selectively abstract those aspects of his experience that are consistent with his preconceived idea of persecution, etc. He may make arbitrary judgments that have no factual basis. These are usually manifested by reading hidden significances and meanings into events. He also tends to overgeneralize isolated instances of intrusion, discrimination, etc.”

Aaron Beck (as cited in Minuchin, 1974)

Social phobia is considered by the American Psychiatric Association (2000) to be “a marked and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others” (p. 456). Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is the most well-documented and well-researched treatment for this debilitating anxiety disorder (Rodebaugh, Holaway, Heimberg, 2004). CBT draws upon two distinct yet inherently coupled theories which produce two types of oft-combined treatments: exposure therapy (ET) and cognitive restructuring (CR). To clarify the terminology, ET refers to exposure treatments-without explicit cognitive interventions-such as imaginal, in virtuo, and in vivo desensitization, relaxation and social skills training, behavioral experiments, and homework assignments (Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Roy et al., 2003). Conversely, CR includes explicit cognitive interventions such as the reduction of self-focused attention, lowered standards of perfection for social performance, the development of positive expectations for social encounters, the development or adjustment of social skills, and the enhancement of overall feelings of self worth (Overholser, 2002).

ET is derived from the classical conditioning paradigm. When paired a sufficient number of times throughout a sufficient amount of time, a neutral stimulus and an unconditioned stimulus will evoke equivalent responsive behaviors separately (Foa, Franklin, & Moser, 2002). This allows for the reduction of the pathological anxiety response through extinction and habituation (Heimberg, 2002). Habituation is associated with a long-term and relatively permanent change in behavior (Leaton & Supple, 1991). According to Foa et al. (2002), there are two conditions that must be met in order for this change in anxiety to be accomplished. First, the individual must be objectively and subjectively experiencing the anxiety response. Second, the information present in the environment must be perceived to be in contrast to the individual’s existing unrealistic and selectively abstracted expectations.

In order for a situational expectation to develop, a previously experienced situation must be subjected to the cognitive processes of perception and reason. When it is formed, the expectation will mediate the thoughts that are had before and throughout any similar situation. This is why a non-threatening social encounter, when preceded by a history of perceived or actual threatening social encounters, may be perceived as threatening and produce anxiety.

This “threatening” perception is reinforced by a socially phobic individual’s tendency, first, to believe that they will behave in an inept and unacceptable manner that will produce unbearable consequences; second, to interpret the symptoms of anxiety as additional sources of danger and anxiety; third, to become preoccupied with their anxiety and negative cognitions within the encounter; fourth, to distort and exaggerate any social cues as being negative; and finally, to interpret these “negative” cues as further evidence of failure (Clark & Wells, 1995). Because of this cyclical process, Stopa & Clark (1993) assert that ET alone does not provide long-term benefits as it is unlikely to change the patient’s negative beliefs and self-defeating cognitions.

In a study conducted by Hoffman (2004), 90 social phobic individuals were assigned to a therapy group in which a modified version of Heimberg’s cognitive-behavioral group therapy (CBGT) was used, an exposure therapy group without explicit cognitive interventions (EGT), or a wait-list control group. The CBGT group was trained in cognitive restructuring and rational thought processing. The EGT group received in vivo exposures, didactic training, and weekly homework assignments. Twenty-one patients prematurely ended treatment. Patients in both group treatments showed significant improvement over the control group on the Social Cost Questionnaire (SCQ) and the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI) that measure patients’ estimated social cost and symptom severity, respectively. Neither group treatment differed significantly from the other at post-test. However, at the 6-month follow-up, the CBGT group showed more improvement on SPAI than the EGT group.

Mattick and Peters (1988) found that a combination of CBGT and ET is superior to ET alone. In the study, 25 patients diagnosed with social phobia according to DSM-III guidelines were assigned to the combined group, while 26 patients received ET alone. Patients in the ET group were required to stay within repeated exposures until their avoidance desire had fully dissipated. Individualized lists of anxiety-invoking situations ordered from least to most feared were employed within the framework of guided exposure. Patients first engaged in those situations invoking only moderate anxiety and gradually ascended to extremely frightening situations. During each behavioral achievement test session, a therapist was present to conduct an assessment and offer support and praise.

The CBGT-ET group received ET in the same format but was required to use cognitive techniques during the exposures. Patients in the combined group received a combination of systematic rational restructuring and rational-emotive therapy and learned cognitive restructuring techniques which allowed them to assess their anxiety as the product of irrational anticipatory and in-situation processing. Pre- and post-treatments showed that the ability to complete behavioral achievement tests of all patients improved significantly. However, at the 3-month follow-up, only 17% of the ET group could complete 100% of the items listed in their fearful situations hierarchy, whereas 52% of the CBGT-ET could complete 100% of the items. Furthermore, 48% of ET group patients reported continued avoidance of feared situations whereas only 14% of CBGT-ET patients reported avoidance of feared situations.

In continuance of Mattick and Peters (1988), Mattick, Peters, and Clarke (1989) assigned 43 patients diagnosed with social phobia to one of four groups: ET, CR, CR-ET, and a wait-list control group. Results indicated that the ability of participants in the ET, CR, and CR-ET groups to complete behavioral achievement tests improved over time. All three groups improved significantly more than the waitlist control group. At the 3-month follow-up, the CR and CR-ET groups showed continual improvement whereas the gains that had been made by the ET group were reduced. The results of this study combined with the results of Mattick and Peters (1988) and Hoffman (2004) highlight the crucial impact of CBT and uphold the effectiveness of the CR-ET combination in treating individuals who suffer from social phobia.

In a review of five meta-analyses, Rodebaugh et al. (2004) found mixed results. When compared to the wait-list control groups at pre- and post-treatment, all CBT treatments of social phobia, which included ET, CR, CR-ET, and applied relaxation showed moderate to large effect sizes and continued improvement at follow-up. The meta-analyses were inconsistent in reported differences between the effect sizes of the ET and CR-ET treatments. Overall, the effect size of CR-ET was superior to the effect size of ET; however, the different did not reach statistical significance. Rodebaugh et al. concluded that CR and ET are so intrinsically related that both treatments heavily “borrow” from one another and, due to ethical concerns, should not be completely dichotomized for the purpose of a meta-analysis.

[This is my undergraduate Psychology 497 thesis from 2004. The title of the study is not meant to imply an ethnographic comparison. The Greeks in my study were fraternity and sorority affiliates. When I conducted this study I was an active member of the Eta Pi chapter of the Pi Kappa Phi fraternity. A social Greek society membership includes a fair amount of societal stereotyping. Unfortunately, Greeks are one of those least-researched minorities and the research that has been conducted often presents Greek life in the most provocative and simplistic of negative terms. I conducted this study to add to the limited body of knowledge and I found that, although affiliates of fraternities and sororities are similar to male and female non-affiliates in their attitudes toward homosexuality, they experience a strong groupthink style of cohesiveness. I present this in APA format with a few web-worthy modification.]

Greek Versus non-Greek: A Comparison of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality

According to the Center for the Study of the College Fraternity (2000), an average of 17.50% of students per campus are either active members of or pledging into the Greek system. Research into the attitudes toward homosexuality of student members of social Greek societies (fraternities and sororities) has been limited. An ethnographic study conducted by Rhoads (1994) revealed a connection between negative attitudes towards lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (LGBs) and membership in a social Greek society. Further ethnographic research conducted by Rhoads (1995) at a fraternity house revealed that oppressive acts towards homosexuals serve to reaffirm masculinity. Rhoads’ conclusion supported the findings of Sanday (1990) who argues that fraternity members may be hiding “…a deep fear, hatred, and fascination with homosexuality” (p. 122).

Other research suggests that there is no empirical connection between Greeks and non-Greeks and negative attitudes toward homosexuals. With 692 heterosexual students at six liberal arts colleges participating, Hinrichs and Rosenberg (2002) investigated attitudes toward homosexuals and homosexuality as a function of Greek affiliation, sex role attitudes, and contact with and knowledge of LGBs. The researchers found that students who tended to be female with liberal sex role attitudes and positive contacts with LGBs were more accepting of LGBs. The results indicated that on campuses with social Greek societies, Greeks did not have significantly more negative attitudes toward homosexuals than non-Greeks. However, campuses with no social Greek societies had significantly more positive overall attitudes toward homosexuality than campuses with social Greek societies.

Kuriloff and Lottes (1994) investigated the extent to which gender, time in college, and membership in a social Greek society influenced students’ political and social attitudes. The researchers measured attitudes regarding liberalism, social conscience, feminism, male dominance, and intolerance of homosexuality. Subjects were students at an eastern United States university. A questionnaire was mailed to freshman students living in a dormitory in 1987. The same questionnaire was mailed again in 1991 to the same students who were still enrolled at the university. Of the 303 students who completed both surveys, 135 were males, 168 were females, and 35% reported membership in a social Greek society. The results indicated a substantial overall decrease of intolerance of homosexuality for all participants from 1987 to 1991. However, Greeks were not more intolerant of homosexuality than non-Greeks. The researchers concluded that Greek affiliation has little impact on student attitudes over time. Additionally, the researchers concluded that, because only a limited amount research has been conducted on the social and political attitudes of Greeks and non-Greeks, empirical support for the hypothesis that Greeks are more intolerant of homosexuality as compared to non-Greeks may exist.

In a similar study, Pratte (1993) examined differences in attitudes of males and females, college students and non-college students, and subjects of various age groups toward homosexuality. In 1986 and again in 1991, a questionnaire was distributed to 90 randomly chosen subjects. Of the 180 participants, 90 were male and 90 were females. Seventy-five were undergraduates enrolled at a university in the midwest and 105 were from a rural community. Similar to the findings of Lottes and Kuriloff, the results indicated that subjects surveyed in 1986, male subjects, and non-student subjects expressed significantly stronger anti-homosexual attitudes than subjects surveyed in 1991, female subjects, and college student subjects.

An increase in tolerance of homosexuality among college students over a period of time may be a function of proximity and past exposure. Bowen and Bourgeois (2001) hypothesized that knowing LGBs prior to college would contribute to more positive attitudes towards homosexuality. Second, they hypothesized that regardless of past exposures, contact with LGBs in student’s residence halls would result in attitudes that are more positive. Finally, the researchers hypothesized that students would rate their own attitudes as more positive than those of friends or of typical students. Subjects for the study were undergraduates living in two similar coed dormitories in close proximity. One hundred and nine students recruited by mail completed the researchers’ survey. Fifty-one were male and 58 were female. The researchers found that there was a significant positive correlation between the number of homosexuals known before college and current level of comfort with homosexuals. Student’s comfort ratings were significantly higher when they reported LGBs living within their residence hall. Student’s comfort ratings were also significantly higher when they reported LGBs living on their floor. Personal comfort with homosexuals was rated significantly higher than the perceived comfort of their friends and higher than a “typical” student’s comfort. Findings indicated that students who had more exposure to LGBs before college felt more comfortable with LGBs when compared to those with less or no pre-college exposure. However, regardless of past exposure, students who reported LGBs living on their halls or on their floors felt significantly more comfortable than students who reported not knowing any close-proximity LGBs.

In a similar study, Herek and Capitanio (1996) obtained similar results from a two-wave national telephone survey. Subjects were randomly selected and were telephoned between 1990 and ‘91 and were telephoned again one year later. Participants indicated their attitudes toward gay males during the first wave and attitudes toward gay males and lesbians during the second wave. Findings were generally similar between both waves and revealed that heterosexual participants with contact with gay males had more positive attitudes toward gay males than those without contact. Those with more and closer relationships had more positive attitudes toward gay males.

Louderback and Whitley Jr. (1997) attempted to explain why males tend to tolerate female homosexuality more so than male homosexuality. They theorized that males place a high erotic value on lesbianism, place a low erotic value on male homosexuality, and have more “traditional” sex-role attitudes. They further theorized that concurrent control of the perceived erotic value of homosexuality and sex-role attitudes would reveal that males have similar attitudes toward lesbians and gays. Subjects were undergraduates from a university in the midwest. Of the 167 subjects surveyed, 58 were males and 109 were females. Participants completed a test booklet in classrooms in same-sex groups of 5 to 20 individuals. Attitudes toward homosexuals were measures by the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men (ATLG) scale, a 20-item survey created by Herek (1984). The instrument includes two subscales, the Attitudes Toward Lesbians (ATL) and Attitudes Toward Gay Men (ATG) scales. An 8-item instrument developed by the researchers measured the perceived erotic value of homosexuality. Two subscales, one referring to lesbian sexuality and one referring to gay male sexuality were comprised of four items each. Sex-role attitudes were measured by the 30-item Attitudes Toward Roles of Men and Women (ATRMW) scale. This instrument has two subscales of 15 items each: the Attitudes Towards Women (ATW) and Attitudes Towards the Male’s Role (AMR) scales. The data revealed that females responded similarly on the ATLG and the perceived erotic value of homosexuality measures. On the other hand, males were more tolerant of lesbian sexuality and perceived it to be more erotic and they were less tolerant of gay male sexuality and perceived it to be less erotic. However, when the perceived erotic value and sex-role attitude scores were controlled for both males and females, the adjusted means closely resembled each other. Female’s scores remained nearly unchanged. However, scores for males were similar to females’ scores towards lesbians and gay males as measured by scores on the ATLG. The researchers concluded that because heterosexual males do not view gay male homosexuality as erotic, heterosexual males may be more likely to discriminate against gay males. Heterosexual females do not view either lesbian or gay male sexuality as erotic and therefore may discriminate equally against both.

In addition to overt intolerance, college students may be unwittingly intolerant of homosexuality. Aberson, Emerson, and Swan (1999) hypothesized that because the descriptor “gay male” may cause a desire to appear sympathetic, participants will overcompensate and prefer a gay male to a straight male in a controlled situation. Bias against a gay male will only become apparent when there is an opportunity to express negative feelings toward gay males in situations where there exists a justification that is not based on sexuality. Participants were undergraduates attending various small, private colleges in southern California. Of the 260 participants, 113 were males and 143 were females. Four subjects did not indicate gender. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: heterosexual-no justification (55), gay-no justification (51), heterosexual-justification (76), and gay-justification (78). Each group was told that their evaluations of an applicant for a new HIV-AIDS education program would affect the hiring process. The duration of the interview videos was five minutes. The actor described himself as acquiring HIV from a brief but sexually intense relationship with either a man or woman depending upon the condition. In bother justified bias conditions, when asked, “Why do you feel college students can relate to you?” the actor answered, “Look, I was a college students. I know how completely stupid and totally naïve college students are.” In both unjustified bias conditions, the actor answered, “Look I was a college student.” Participants were fully debriefed and duplicity was revealed after participation in the study. The evaluation measure was a 29-item instrument. Subjects responded to items on 7-point scales. The instrument included two subscales: 19 items that indicated positive traits and 10 items that indicated negative traits about the interviewee. A 7-item instrument measured attitudes toward homosexuals. Subjects responded to these items on 5-point scales. The results revealed that the gay male was rated significantly more favorable overall than the heterosexual male. The gay male in the justified bias condition was more favored than the heterosexual male in the same condition. The researchers found that participants did not rate the gay male negatively regardless of condition. However, the gay male tended to be rated higher on negative trait items and the heterosexual male in the no justification condition tended to be rated higher on positive trait items. The findings led Aberson et al. to conclude that there was evidence of a covert form of bias in which the participants elevated the heterosexual man and did not diminish the gay man.

While many strides have been made to afford homosexuals equal rights, prejudice, discrimination, and victimization still exist. In a study conducted by Norris (1992) at Oberlin College, findings indicated widespread victimization of LGBs. A survey distributed by mail was completed by 869 students of whom 26.3% of females and 15.7% of males claimed a lesbian, gay, or bisexual sexual orientation. Of the two groups, 80% of females and over 70% of males either had denied their sexual orientation or were verbally insulted for being perceived as homosexual. On the other hand, 95.5% of students supported the active campus presence of LGBs. Norris theorized that this paradox results from support of equal rights by a majority but the practice of equal rights by a minority.

Due to the lack of prior research in this area and due to the high rate of victimization of homosexuals, the purpose of this study is to examine attitudes towards homosexuals as a function of Greek affiliation. The researcher hypothesized that Greeks would score significantly higher on measures of intolerance towards homosexuality than non-Greeks.

If you needed more proof that our narcissistic society is out of with itself in terms of love and intimacy, look no further:

Edie says the parties which are held around the country and in our area are meant to help people achieve better intimacy, and communication. And it allows people to express themselves in a comfortable and safe environment.

There’s snuggling, nuzzling and even spooning. But not everyone’s ready for a group hug right away since you may not know everyone. So to get comfortable there are a few steps to start with.

The first step, whether you’re with a partner or by yourself, is to sit and chat in a welcome circle. You hear the rules which include asking permission and getting a verbal yes before you touch anybody. And if everyone agrees to all of the rules, the cuddling begins.

“I love experiencing the feelings that come up when you connect with each individual person,” said cuddle party-goer Linda Hunter at a recent Phoenixville party.

William Todd Schultz on diagnostication:

Let me begin by saying this: No, I don’t believe every artistic genius is mad. Nor do I believe that every mad person is secretly (or not-so-secretly) artistic. Both are statistical outliers, the two do intersect occasionally in enormously interesting ways that I plan to talk about a lot, but they are not one and the same. There is no essential connection. A tendency that does seem to be increasing in frequency, however, and it’s a tendency I generally deplore, is the diagnosing of artists as a means of explaining their art. The process usually goes something like this: Sylvia Plath was consumed by the idea of killing herself, she was emotionally erratic, her moods were labile, she was occasionally full of rage, her interpersonal dynamics were complex, so she must have suffered from borderline personality disorder. “Shazam,” the interpreter declares, popping the champagne cork. “I have explained Sylvia Plath.”

But a diagnosis is not an explanation. It is merely a description, a name for a set of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, not a real answer. What we want to know is how someone became who she is, not what her DSM-derived “disease” might be. I talk a lot about this subject in chapter one of my Handbook of Psychobiography. You can check that out for more detail.
  Here’s a little illustration I use in my psychobiography courses. Say a mother tells a psychiatrist, “My son hears voices. Why?” The psychiatrist answers, “Well, sorry to say this, but it’s because he’s a schizophrenic.” Mom replies: “Oh. Well, how do you know he’s a schizophrenic?” Psychiatrist says, “Because he hears voices.” See how, in fact, we get nowhere?

In this post, Schultz promotes his field of study, psychobiography. But he purposefully does so at the expense of psychological diagnostication. Other academics have done this and I find it maddening.

What’s their beef? Criticism of diagnostication usually falls into one of three categories. First, making a diagnosis is incomplete in terms of treatment. Second, having a diagnosis incurs social stigma. And, finally, particular diagnoses include too many or not enough symptoms.

Now, it is true that treatment of a psychological condition should always be more than diagnosis and prescription. You have to be low on the brain scale to think otherwise. Furthermore, the researchers who study the symptom clusters are the ones who should decide what symptoms are included and excluded and they should not be criticized for what are predominantly media-fueled hysterics.

Here’s what the critics fail to understand:  Diagnostication is a way for care providers to succinctly share patient information and is the most adequate method to dictate treatment. It is not a sacred ritual and a diagnosis is never carved into stone. It is simply asinine for Schultz to assert that anyone with half the intelligence needed to graduate graduate school believes that, after a diagnosis is made, additionaly understanding of a patient magically becomes unnecessary.

On the Thursday edition of NPR’s Most E-Mailed Stories Podcast, I heard the sad story of Charles Morris, the banker and economic historian who noticed the recent economic travesties and wrote a book about it. However, regardless of his place on the best-sellers list, evolutionary psychology teaches up that, essentially, many people could have read his book but would have not heeded his warning.

Error management theory posits that, when faced with a decision of which we are not sure of the consequences, we are more apt to “play it safe” and deny the option that is likely to produce the most adverse consequences. Ponder:

The allure of “getting rich” and the notion of economic scarcity are so strong that, in my opinion, people will gamble away their savings. However, this assumes a level playing field: If you play your cards well enough, you will procure a gain. Even a modest gain would be acceptable. Unfortunately, everyone else plays the game to make money and the few who have the resources to make the system work to their advantage will do so. They will purposefully create a scenario in which you will give them your savings and you will never see a return. And there will always be a plethora of people willing to take that risk. Hence obtaining more money and engaging in more wars will always be the goal of our wonderfully jingoed rulers.

Introduction: The BSCT Program

In a review of unclassified United States government data, Denbeaux et al. (2006) concluded that, of the 517 “unlawful combatants” detained at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp for more than four years, 55% had not been charged with engaging in hostilities against the United States or its coalition allies and 60% are detained for being “associated with” one or more terrorist organizations. Additionally, “[o]nly 8% of the detainees were characterized as al Qaeda fighters. Of the remaining detainees, 40% have no definitive connection with al Qaeda at all and 18%…have no definitive affiliation with either al Qaeda or the Taliban” (Denbeaux et al., 2006, p. 2).

In 2005, a small group of civilian medical professionals, which included New England Journal of Medicine contributing editor Dr. Susan Okie, visited the Camp Delta to be briefed by the commander of Guantánamo Bay, Major General Jay W. Hood, on the current state of the medical and mental health care provided to the detainees. Because of safety and privacy concerns, the group was not permitted to see or talk to the detainees (Okie, 2005). Of main concern to the group was the possible involvement of medical personnel in the mistreatment of the detainees. Specifically, the group was curious about the Behavior Science Consultation Team (BSCT, pronounced “Biscuit”) program.

The BSCT program began in 2002 and was approved for use at Guantánamo Bay by then commander Major General Geoffrey Miller to develop behavioral and psychological strategies that would expedite the gathering of intelligence from the “more than 100 detainees considered to have high intelligence value” (Okie, 2005, p. 2532). The BSCT at Guantánamo Bay included a psychiatrist and a psychologist who “prepared psychological profiles for use by interrogators [and]…sat in on some interrogations, observed other from behind one-way mirrors, and offered feedback to interrogator” (Bloche & Marks, 2005a, p. 7). The role of the BSCT medical personnel in the abuse of Mohammed al-Qahtani, a detainee determined to be of high intelligence value, is well documented (Miles, 2007).

Via Right Wing Watch, this one from Tony Perkins’ Family Research Council (FRC) hurts:

The Democratic Leadership is rushing to the floor this week H.R. 1424, the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act. The bill would place a massive new government mandate on private businesses to provide healthcare coverage for mental illness. Of even more concern, though, is the fact that rather than limit the coverage mandate to severe and debilitating illness, the bill uses the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as the basis for identifying conditions that must be covered. Among the more troubling diagnoses incorporated into DSM-IV are:

• Circadian rhythm sleep disorder (jet lag type);
• Caffeine intoxication;
• Sibling relational problem;
• Substance-induced sexual dysfunction;
• Gender identity disorder;
• Necrophilia;
• Transvestic fetishism; and
• Pedophilia.

Under H.R. 1424, employers offering group coverage would be required to provide benefits related to these and similar diagnoses included in DSM-IV. In addition, the bill provides no conscience clause for employers who have religious or moral objections to covering the psycho-sexual disorders, including those noted above [emphasis mine].

I’ve found that, for a reason unknown to me, some people are against mental illness diagnoses until a family member or the family suffers from the effects of a diagnosable mental illness. After a bit of mulling, they pour over their options like hot cheese on Panera’s French onion soup.

Physical illnesses like Alzheimer’s and diabetes do not fall within politically or religiously correct boundaries. Mental illnesses are the same. Incidentally, FRC President Tony Perkins has a son named David. If David were to ever come out as a homosexual, it’s very likely that Mr. Perkins would want his son to engage in the “fix the gayness in you” therapy know as reparative therapy. FRC’s position on homosexual

FRC does not consider homosexuality an alternative lifestyle or sexual “preference”; it is unhealthy and destructive to individual persons, families, and society. Compassion–not bigotry–compels us to support the healing of homosexuals who wish to change their destructive behavior.

alludes to this sort of treatment. A “sibling relational problem” that is causing distress is obviously not as high as homosexuality on the FRC disorders-needing-treatment hierarchy. But, maybe that’s the point.

YourMorals.org is a website designed to easily and efficiently turn us into the guinea pigs of five social scientists. The results of the various personality tests are presented in bar-graph form: one bar for your results and one bar for the results of everyone else. Additionally, on more than a few results pages, the results of Democrats and Republicans are represented by separate bars.

The researchers’ central inventory is the “Moral Foundations Questionnaire”:

The scale is a measure of your reliance on and endorsement of five psychological foundations of morality that seem to be found across cultures. Each of the two parts of the scale contained four questions related to each foundation: 1) harm/care, 2) fairness/reciprocity (including issues of rights), 3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and 5) purity/sanctity.

Democrats hold the “harm” and “fairness” foundations more dear than the remaining foundations. Republicans place equal value on all five foundations. My results (in green) are closest to those of Democrats (in blue):

The researchers’ article on their 5-foundation theory of morality begins with an interesting scenario:

Suppose your next-door neighbor puts up a large sign in her front yard that says “Cable television will destroy society.” You ask her to explain the sign, and she replies, “Cables are an affront to the god Thoth. They radiate theta waves, which make people sterile.” You ask her to explain how a low voltage, electrically-shielded coaxial cable can make anyone sterile, but she changes the subject. The DSM-IV defines a delusion as “a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary” (APA, DSM-IV, 1994, p.765). Your neighbor is clearly delusional and possibly schizophrenic. She is responding to forces, threats, and agents that simply do not exist.

But now suppose another neighbor puts up a large sign in his front yard that says “Gay marriage will destroy society.” You ask him to explain the sign, and he replies, “Homosexuality is an abomination to God. Gay marriage will undermine marriage, the institution upon which our society rests.” You ask him to explain how allowing two people to marry who are in love and of the same sex will harm other marriages, but he changes the subject. Because your neighbor is not alone in his beliefs, he does not meet the DSM-IV criteria for delusion. However, you might well consider your homophobic neighbor almost as delusional, and probably more offensive, than your cable-fearing neighbor. He, too, seems to be responding to forces, threats, and agents that do not exist, only in this case his widely shared beliefs have real victims: the millions of men and women who are prohibited from marrying the people they love, and who are treated unjustly in matters of family law and social prestige. If only there were some way to break through your neighbor’s delusions-some moral equivalent of Thorazine-which would help him see the facts as you see them.

Additionally, each foundation is defined in full. In my mind, I cannot understand how all five foundations can be given equal consideration. In order to ensure its survival, authority often becomes oppressive through the harming of others and the subjugation of fairness. Deference to authority is usually manifested through loyalty to the group. So, not only is individualism an affront to authority, it threatens the existence of the group and the life of every member. For more reading on authority and loyalty, 1984 covers the dangers associated with group thought and group submission well.